[EM] Condorcet PR (was Comparing ranked versus unranked methods)

[DEMOREP1 at aol.com]

Forest wrote in part-

Demorep has posted cryptic messages about PR Condorcet from time to time,
but I haven't been able to decipher them. 

----
D-  PR Condorcet is the multi-winner legislative body case of Condorcet for 
single winners.

The voters vote 1, 2, etc for their legislative body choices.

Do all combinations of N Test Winners versus Test Loser (with others being 
deemed Other Test Losers) (which would obviously require computerized voting 
for any large election-- resulting in a rather large matrix for all of the 
combinations).

If a test winner wins in ALL of his/her Test Winners combinations, then 
he/she is a PR Condorcet Winner (PRCW).

Example--  Elect 3, 7 candidates

A sample test combination-

A,D,F   versus B    (C, E presumed losers)

The later choice votes from C and E may go to A,D,F or B (and get added to 
the first choice votes for A,D,F and B).

If A,D or F do NOT get more final votes than B, then, respectively A, D or F 
is NOT a PRCW.

If they each do get more final votes than B, then replace B with C or E and 
redo the math.

Since lots of circular ties are possible, I suggest, as with single winner 
Condorct that a YES/NO vote be done to resolve ties.

Each final winner would have a voting power in the legislative body equal to 
the votes he/she receives --- proxy p.r.

Thus for a 3 member legislative body there might finally be something like --

B 42 (of party X)
D 40 (of party Y)
A 18 (of party Z)

 100 total voters/votes

Expand for ANY public legislative body (probably with a limit of circa 5 
seats per district -- with districts having some semi-permanent status --- 
rather than the every ten year gerrymander circus in each State).

It may be easier to get Condorcet PR (CPR) for legislative body elections 
after a single winner reform method (such as Condorcet Single Winner (CSW)) 
gets adopted to replace plurality for single winner executive elections.