[EM] 12/13/02 - Giving `crutches to weak candidates':

[Dave Ketchum]

Perhaps Donald should be called a Charlatan and a fraud for wandering into 
battle without being better armed.  Perhaps he should be pitied for 
apparently not understanding this.

Condorcet and IRV are almost identical twins, using identical ballots, 
looking at lower choices whenever they choose to, and usually agreeing as 
to winner:
      Condorcet always looks at lower choices, being influenced whenever 
they matter.
      IRV looks at lower choices only when it realizes it cannot make a 
decision based only on upper choices.

Let us try a sample election:  District is agreed on everything, including 
that Donald should be required to dye his hair, but half favoring Pink and 
half favoring Green for dye.  Identical triplets run for office, one 
campaigning Pink and two Green - and each getting identical public 
campaign funds:
      Plurality:  1/2 vote P; 1/4 vote G1; 1/4 vote G2.  It was the mix of 
candidates, electorate, and method that guaranteed the P win - none 
qualified for the label "weak".  If even 34% of the voters vote P, P wins 
for G1 and G2 would have to share 66% - among the reasons for ditching 
Plurality.
      Approval:  Here votes go to P, or to G1 and G2, a near 3-way tie - 
reflecting voter sentiment.
      IRV:  Similar votes and two steps:  G1 vs G2 and winner picks up 
loser's second choice votes, setting up a near tie with P.
      Condorcet:  Similar votes and near 3-way tie recognized in one step, 
for complete ballots are always counted.

While voters make odd choices for many reasons, probably including pity, 
they can as well do this for first choice as for lower - in the three 
above methods that offer room for both odd and serious choices, going odd 
for first choice does no harm unless MANY voters vote the same odd choice.

Like IRV, separate runoffs have been around a long time.  Separate runoffs 
almost frustrated French voters into riots this year and, given a similar 
set of candidates and voters, IRV could easily have stumbled into the same 
result.

Dave Ketchum

On Sat, 14 Dec 2002 04:58:03 -0500 Donald E Davison wrote:

> 12/12/02 - Giving `crutches to weak candidates':
> 
> Greetings Alex and EM list members,
> 
> Alex, you wrote: "Healthy competition does NOT include giving crutches to
> weak candidates..."
> 
> This is something we agree on, but if you truly believe this, then why are
> you supporting Condorcet and/or Approval Voting?  For, this is what these
> two method do, they give `crutches to weak candidates'.
> 
> Alex: "...but it does include removing incentives for a candidate to avoid
> votes, e.g. non-monotonicity."
> 
> Donald: Non-monotonicity is a bad joke, it does not exist, it has never
> happened in a real election, it only happens in extreme examples concocted
> by the Charlatans.
> 
> Irving has been in use for over eighty years in real election in the real
> world and not once has there been an election in which one of the
> Charlatans' extreme examples occured.  Can you say the same for Approval
> Voting?  The ball's in the court of the Charlatans to prove that
> non-monotonicity has ever influenced an Irving election, they have eighty
> years of Irving experience to draw from.
> 
> A few months ago I posted some real ballots to this list and requested
> anyone to use the ballots and prove that Irving or STV can be
> non-monotonicity in the real world.  No one responded.
> 
> 
> The Great Thinker, Tom Ruen, wrote: "I support IRV over Approval because it
> best protects voters from themselves."
> 
> Most voters do not need to make lower choices.  In an Irving election, this
> will not matter because only one choice at a time will be charged with a
> vote, but in Condorcet and Approval elections, these lower choices will be
> `pity votes'.  The voters need to learn not to make `pity votes'.  It is
> best to use an election method in which `pity votes' will have little
> effect.
> 
> Any success that weak candidates may hope to have over strong candidates
> will depend on `pity votes' received by the weak candidates.  The
> Charlatans know that if voters are given more votes then some voters will
> foolishly make the mistake of handing out `pity votes' and maybe these
> `pity votes' will make the difference in winning an election for the
> Charlatans' weak candidate.  It is proper for a jurisdiction to select a
> method that will protect votes from themselves, from their own `pity
> votes'.  That method is Irving.
> 
> Pity votes will have little influence in an Irving election, but the bad
> effects of `pity votes' can easily happen in the two methods, Condorcet and
> Approval.  Anyone is a fraud who tries to promote these two dubious methods
> because they are attempting to trick the voters into making valuable `pity
> votes' - valuable to the supporters of the weak candidates.  Fraud is the
> word that defines a Charlatan.  So, if you don't wish to be called a
> Charlatan, then don't be one.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Regards,
>    Donald Davison, host of New Democracy at http://www.mich.com/~donald

-- 
  davek at clarityconnect.com    http://www.clarityconnect.com/webpages3/davek
   Dave Ketchum    108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY  13827-1708    607-687-5026
              Do to no one what you would not want done to you.
                    If you want peace, work for justice.

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