[EM] Nash Equilibria, CR, and Approval

[Alex Small]

My argument about Nash Equilibria was based on a fallacy:  Although a
single faction of voters may be indifferent between giving a candidate
partial points versus full or zero points, a player changing from one
strategy to another may change incentives for another faction.

For instance, if we have an equilibrium where B wins and a faction
prefering A over B gave A partial points, B might still win if that
faction gave A full points.  However, the Nash Equilibrium might still be
destroyed by that faction's strategic adjustment.  It may be that A now
has sufficient votes so that he will win if another faction preferring A
over B gave A more points.



Alex


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