[EM] Need IRV examples; voting show
Adam H Tarr
atarr at ecn.purdue.edu
Mon Dec 9 12:16:44 PST 2002
Olli Salmi wrote:
>First, when a candidate is in danger of being eliminated, we are obliged to
>move into his line, if we have marked a preference for him on our ballot
>Second [...] If we have voted for both the last and the second
>to the last candidate, we have to step back and abstain until the
>elimination has been decided, even if one of the candididates is our first
>preference.
Note that if you got rid of this second change to IRV (but leave the first), you
no longer have Approval. Rather, you have a form of Condorcet voting. This
will reliably elect the Condorcet winner if one exists, and it will elect a
member of the Smith set if one does not. Beyond that, I'm not really sure -
there's no equivalence to ranked pairs or beatpath, but maybe one of the more
obscure Condorcet completion methods is similar to this.
I wouldn't advocate this approach for public use, but it's a way to see
Condorcet as an extension or a fix of runoff methods. If I were trying to talk
an IRV advocate into supporting Condorcet, this might be a good tack to take -
"why not let everyone vote in the elimination, so a strong compromise candidate
won't get bounced too early?"
-Adam
----
For more information about this list (subscribe, unsubscribe, FAQ, etc),
please see http://www.eskimo.com/~robla/em
More information about the Election-Methods
mailing list