[EM] Need IRV examples; voting show

Adam H Tarr atarr at ecn.purdue.edu
Mon Dec 9 12:16:44 PST 2002


Olli Salmi wrote:

>First, when a candidate is in danger of being eliminated, we are obliged to
>move into his line, if we have marked a preference for him on our ballot

>Second [...] If we have voted for both the last and the second
>to the last candidate, we have to step back and abstain until the
>elimination has been decided, even if one of the candididates is our first
>preference. 

Note that if you got rid of this second change to IRV (but leave the first), you 
no longer have Approval.  Rather, you have a form of Condorcet voting.  This 
will reliably elect the Condorcet winner if one exists, and it will elect a 
member of the Smith set if one does not.  Beyond that, I'm not really sure - 
there's no equivalence to ranked pairs or beatpath, but maybe one of the more 
obscure Condorcet completion methods is similar to this.

I wouldn't advocate this approach for public use, but it's a way to see 
Condorcet as an extension or a fix of runoff methods.  If I were trying to talk 
an IRV advocate into supporting Condorcet, this might be a good tack to take -  
"why not let everyone vote in the elimination, so a strong compromise candidate 
won't get bounced too early?"

-Adam

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