[EM] Power of votes with approval

Adam Tarr atarr at purdue.edu
Sun Dec 8 13:10:43 PST 2002


Steph, I think I read you wrong, but I'm not sure what you WERE trying to 
say...

>>However, the optimal strategy with information obtained from polls, is to 
>>vote for your
>>favourite and any other candidate you like that the poll says it would 
>>beat your
>>favourite.
>
>No again.  If your favorite candidate is in last place in the polls, this 
>strategy suggests you should vote for every candidate, which is obviously 
>a waste.

I clearly misinterpreted what you wrote, but what you wrote doesn't seem to 
constitute a complete strategy.  I still don't know who to vote for unless 
you can define "candidate you like".  If it means better than the average, 
than this strategy is hardly optimal.

At any rate, the rest of what I wrote, about the well-worn optimal approval 
strategies, stands.

>What you probably meant to say is, "vote for **the candidate you would 
>vote for in a plurality election** and any other candidate you like that 
>the poll says it would beat **that candidate**.  This assumes that you 
>would vote "lesser-of-two-evils" in a plurality race.
>
>This strategy is pretty good, but it's not quite the best - there are 
>situations where this approach could make you regret your vote, even if 
>the polls are fairly accurate.  A better strategy is, "vote for anyone you 
>like more than the front runner, and the front runner as well if you like 
>him/her more than the second place candidate."  The only difference here 
>is that if you like the second place candidate more than the first place 
>candidate, you will vote for candidates you like more than one but less 
>than the other.
>
>-Adam


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