[EM] Approval CS, 3 coalitions
MIKE OSSIPOFF
nkklrp at hotmail.com
Sun Dec 15 14:46:27 PST 2002
Say that instead of 3 candidates, we have 3 coalitions within which
of each everyone votes for all the coalition's candidates.
Then, a coalition could have a majority of all the voters without
any of its candidates having a majority, and in that case the
majority favorite provision of Approval+favorite wouldn't do anything.
In some ways Approval+favorite CS is like ordinary Approval+favorite,
but in some ways it's different, in a positive way.
Say the 3 coalitions are Republicans, Democrats, and Nader-preferring
people. Each of these coalitions could have several candidates,
and, as I said, within each coalition everyone votes for all of its
candidates.
As with ordinary Approval, if no coalition votes for any other
coalition's candidates, the winner comes from the coalition with the
most voters.
Say the Nader coalition vote for the Dem candidates, and no other
coalition votes for other coalition's candidates. If the Nader coalition
has a majority of all the voters, they still win. Their unreciprocated
voteshareing doesn't give the election away as it would in ordinary
Approval or ordinary Approval+favorite.
The Dems can improve their score by voting for the Nader candidates.
Say, then, that the Dems & the Nader people vote for eachother's
candidates.
As in ordinary Approval, the winner comes from that new Dem/Nader
coalition if they have a majority, and the scores of the Dems and
Nader candidates would be equal.
(In ordinary Approval, the fact that the Dems are more numerous than
the Nader people means that the Dem candidates will outscore them).
Say it's A, B, & C, in the old badexample in which A & B are nearly
identical, with nearly identical favoriteness-support, and that
C is the last choice of the A & B voters. Again, A, B, & C could be
coalitions instead of individual candidates.
Again, of course if the coalitions vote only for their own candidates,
the winner will come from the coalition with the most voters.
Say the C voters vote only for C.
Say the A & B voters vote for both A & B.
As in ordinary Approval, the winner comes from A or B if the A &
B voters add up to a majority.
Say the A voters vote for B, but the B voters don't vote for A.
The winner comes from the A coalition if the A coalition has a majority
of the voters, unlike ordinary Approval, in which the A voters would
have given the election away to the B coalition.
Well those 2 scenarios, R, D, & N and A, B, & C, are about the same
in their results.
I'm not suggesting that CS should be proposed now instead of Approval,
because CS's definition and behavior are too unconventional to be
accepted until people are more democratically involved than they
now are. Now, Approval and other CR versions are the best public
proposal.
Mike Ossipoff
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