Other Criteria

[MIKE OSSIPOFF]

Steph--

You wrote:


I have continued studying criterias behavior.

A strong CW using your definition...


I reply:

I don't have a definition of a strong CW. I've never used that term,
much less defined it.

You continued:

...needs 51% of the votes against
any opponent.

First, with margins a strong CW exists too, but it needs at least
67 % support of the full electorate in each pairwise victory against
every opponent. The same is valid for (rm).

I reply:

That's something that I should take your word for, because strong
CW isn't my term, and no criterion, method, or method-merit argument
that I've made uses that term.

You continued:

This is where Adam has the fun of searching a counter-example,
it is his turn...
If you replace the strong CW by this strong CW(margin), margin
would satisfy a SFC(margin) criteria. The same with (rm).

I reply:

Have you defined an SFC(margin) criterion? If so, I've missed it, and
so could you re-post it?

You continued:

Maybe you would like to name it differently than strong CW(margin-rm)...

The stronger CW could be a valid name?

I reply:

Strong CW is your term, and you can define it as you like, and can
define it differently for each measure of defeats. And you can use it
in the definitions of your criteria. Likewise, you can define any
criteria you want to, and then, if you want to, you can compare them
to other criteria--but only after you've posted definitions of your
criteria.

You continued:


SFC can be viewed as criteria dependent.

I reply:

SFC is a criterion. It isn't dependent on any other criterion.
It is one of several criteria that measure for the standards of
majority rule and reducing the need for drastically insincere defensive
strategy.

You continued:

It is obvious to me now
that the SFC(wv) (the real and maybe only SFC you could say) is better
protecting from insincere truncation than SFC(margin-rm).

I reply:

Yes, and it also protects against majority rule violations caused
by innocent, nonstrategic truncation. Those things are true although
SFC doesn't mention truncation.

For instance, SFC is failed by methods
such as IRV and Plurality, in which there isn't an offensive strategy
of truncation. But yes, in Condorcet versions, the failures involve
truncation.

You continued:

Second, it is possible to build a graphical representation to compare
these criterias.

I reply:

Maybe, but when you post your definitions of your criteria, you can
compare them with other criteria, if you want to, by just stating
the criteria and asking which sounds more important, and why.

Mike Ossipoff



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