[EM] Proportional Representation via Approval Voting

[LAYTON Craig]

Bart wrote:

>With a non-ranked system, it is much easier for the method itself to be
>internally consistent, while still remaining flexible enough to
>accommodate non-equidistant utilities, etc.  It is not as important to
>maximize Condorcet efficiency, for example, since you have no actual
>ranked votes on which to determine the Condorcet winner.  A moderately
>high but consistent Condorcet efficiency (based on unvoted sincere
>preferences) is probably more desirable than a perfect one, since this
>leaves room for eliminating extremely unpopular Condorcet winners.

Yes, I do agree that Condorcet winners are not always the candidates who
should really win.  I do, however, like the way that a ranked system
standardises the power of votes.

>As far as always electing the most preferred candidate of an absolute
>majority, you have to be able to guarantee sincere ranking in order to
>guarantee that outcome.  If you can't guarantee sincere ranking, then a
>ranked method can only claim a majority based on the actual ballots --
>which you can do just as well with Approval.

This is more important than Condorcet compliance, and I still think Approval
fails.  I don't really want to be drawn into another protracted argument
over specific wording of criteria, but I don't think that you can claim a
majority based on the actual ballots with Approval, simply because Approval
does not allow you to express who your most preferred candidate is.  This
just means that the balloting system doesn't pick up enough information from
the voter in order to fairly decide who the winner should be.

I think that an essential criteria of a single winner election in a
democracy is that, if sixty percent (or eighty or ninety percent) like one
candidate better than any other candidate that is standing, and they vote
accordingly, then that candidate should win.  The fact that people might not
vote sincerely is a tricky issue.  If you accept that this is a problem, the
question becomes 'why have elections at all?'.  The better Condorcet systems
are less prone to strategic (and even insincere) voting, so this might be a
consideration.