[EM] Why use more than two grades?
Joe Weinstein
jweins123 at hotmail.com
Fri Jan 19 17:32:05 PST 2001
WHY USE MORE THAN TWO GRADES?
In response (1/17) to my last posting (1/16), Bart Ingles asks:
"One question: why would any voter want to vote anything other than 0.0 or
1.0 for any individual candidate? I understand that a voter may be truly
undecided about a candidate, but in that case why wouldn't a coin-toss serve
just as well?"
WHY ME? To be fair, these basic queries ought to be put not just to me but
to ALL advocates of what are in effect higher-resolution grading methods
(more than two grade values allowed). These methods include all schemes -
e.g. Borda, Condorcet, cumulative' voting, and instant runoff'- which
allow (or indeed even force) strict ranking of three or more candidates.
Nontrivial instances of (and discussions about) these methods require three
or more grade values.
In fact, only two methods discussed on this list DON'T use more than two
grade values, namely the prevalent lone-mark (plurality), and pass-fail
(approval').
Here are my basic responses to Bart's basic queries.
RESPONSE TO FIRST QUERY. For many intimate or smaller-scale elections,
pass-fail (approval') grading, using just two grades, will be adequate -
and may be required for simplicity of tabulation. However, in larger or
more public elections, with thousands or even millions of voters, use of
higher-resolution grading will impose little or no extra burden on the
already requisite computerized tabulation. Moreover, as it is unlikely that
any outcome will be determined by a single vote, a major electoral function
and voter motivation - and arguably a civil right of both voters and
candidate - is conferred when the available grade levels allow a voter V to
express her (or his) evaluations to higher resolution.
In brief, a voter V should (and may as well, given modern technology) be
enabled to better express her grade of each candidate. Closer realization
of this goal is a major reason for considering alternative election methods
at all.
Even with just two candidates, V may well wish to send a message' to future
politics, that her favored candidate has most, but far from all, of her
support. For example, she may wish to vote A 0.6, B 0.0 . Or, with three
candidates, she may wish to express a judgment that B is much worse (or
anyhow much less worthy of support) than A but much better than C, e.g.: A
1.0, B 0.6, C 0.1. For a 6 Nov. 2000 example using candidates initials
(with IW =Ideal Write-In), I myself wanted to vote something like: IW 1.0,
AG 0.8, RN 0.7, HB 0.3, GB 0.2, PB 0.0.
Maybe most voters in most elections will not care to use the grading option
to its fullest degree. That situation would contradict neither this
option's benefits nor its very necessity, as a attainable civil right of
free expression, for voters and candidates. One could as well rule out any
one of some better-known civil rights and liberties, e.g. freedom of speech
or of the press, on the grounds that relatively few citizens ever use these
options to their fullest, or at all.
RESPONSE TO SECOND QUERY. If voter V truly cannot credibly assign candidate
C some minimal nonzero grade, then C may as well receive the grade 0, -
either explicitly from V, or by automatic default from V's failure to mark
any grade for C.
Joe Weinstein
Long Beach CA USA
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