PAV (fwd)

[Forest Simmons]

Here's a copy of my response to Michael Welford:

Forest

---------- Forwarded message ----------
Date: Wed, 17 Jan 2001 14:48:58 -0800 (PST)
From: Forest Simmons <fsimmons at pcc.edu>
To: Michael Welford <welfordm at earthlink.net>
Subject: Re:PAV

It sounds like we've been thinking along the same lines.

Since sums like 1 + 1/2 + ... + 1/k and 1 + 1/3 + ... + 1/(2*k-1)  are
asymptotic to log(k) for logarithms of various bases, it suggests that
asymptotically one could almost use the geometric mean of the various k's
as a guage of satisfaction of the voters.

Of course, one voter with k=0 would throw everything off.  Perhaps this
could be taken care of by including an ideal dummy candidate in every
panel or slate being guaged, and incrementing the number of winners by one
so that when the ideal candidate is withdrawn from the winning coalition
there are still enough left to fill the vacant seats. 

By the way, your idea for filling the seat of a candidate who had to
withdraw after winning was clever.

I like PAV as an acronymn for Proportional Approval Voting.  I consider it
to be one member of the class DRLR.

Forest 

Do you mind if I forward your message to the election methods list along
with this response?