[EM] Complete voting

[LAYTON Craig]

>The rules that I've seen for Cumulative say that your available
>voting power is divided equally among those candidates whom you've
>marked on your ballot. That's the method that I was referring to
>when I said "single-winner Cumulative". 

I'd always understood it to be kind of like block voting (but number of
votes = number of candidates rather than number of seats to fill) and you
may distribute those votes amoung as many  candidates as you like, in any
fashion.  I thought that was how it was defined on the CVD website, but I
may have been mistaken.

>It isn't about sincerity at all. I thought we agreed that
>completeness isn't a requirement for sincerity.

Yes, but I think that the criteria is meaningless if you invent an arbitrary
concept (complete voting) in order to define it.  It is a much better
criteria (better to meet) if it is based on an intuitive and applicable
definiton of sincerity.

>Of course a point system can be similar to a pairwise-count
>system, in the sense that it can allow you to vote all of your
>sincere preferences, and so I don't know if some point systems can
>meet CC by my definition. It's something to check, of course.
>If they can, and you say that's a fault of my definition, then
>I'd reply by asking if you prefer the usual CC definitions by
>which all methods fail, or Plurality passes.

My definition of sincerity was part of the CC definiton that I posted.  It
uses both an intuitive definition of sincerity and a CC that plurality (for
example) does not pass.  It would seem that our CCs would pass and fail the
same methods, but I am just questioning your approach to the issue of
creating meaningfull criteria.  If you didn't read my CC, I can post it
again, but the gist was that a method passes it where, for every set of
sincere preferences with a sincere Condorcet winner, there is a set of
ballots that are all sincere and that result in the election of the
Condorcet winner.