[EM] Condorcet Criterion for plurality.

[LAYTON Craig]

Martin Harper wrote:
>> Okay.  Maybe I'm understanding it differently to Markus.  I haven't read
the
>> literature he refers to, but I would think it was fairly straightforward.
A
>> voter has a set of preferences (A>B>C) either sincere or insincere, it
>> doesn't matter as long as those are the preferences a voter intends to
vote
>> (not strategic).  You posit that the preferences exist,
>
>Ok - I don't think that is accurate.
>
>I have a sincere set of preferences. I do not have a set of preferences I
intend
>to vote. How I intend to vote will not be known until I know what the
voting
>system is - how I may mark the ballot paper - and so forth. It will also
change
>depending on my knowledge of the rest of the electorate.

And Mike wrote:
>Wait a minute. You said it doesn't matter if they're sincere or
>not. If so, why are you saying they aren't strategic? If they're
>not sincere, then might not an insincere ballot be strategic?

Allright, you have a sincere set of preferences, and for every sincere set
of preferences and voting system, there is at least one sincere vote that
you can cast (unless you like all candidates the same).  I happen to think
that truncated votes count as sincere (for a number of reasons).  This poses
a particular problem, because it means that a Condorcet voting system could
fail a Condorcet Criteria, if that criteria is based on sincere preferences.
There is more, but I need to think about it.