[EM] Condorcet Criterion for plurality.

[MIKE OSSIPOFF]

David Catchpole said:

>Votes:
>
>A>B>C
>A>B>C
>A>B>C
>B>A>C
>B>A>C
>C>A>B
>C>A>B
>C>A>B
>C>A>B
>
>Using plurality, C wins. If we assume that voters have rankings, _whether
>or not they can express them on their ballots_, then plurality fails a
>Condorcet criterion.

For one thing, Markus says he assumes that they _do_ express rankings
on a ballot. Or ratings. For another thing, all you've shown is that
if we assume that voters vote (or have) rankings, and we have a
rule that says that we must use those rankings to determine who should
win, by Condorcet's Criterion, and that we must then count a top-rank
position as a Plurality vote to determine who actually does win--
if we stipulate that special rule for Plurality, then Plurality fails
Condorcet's Criterion.

But, Catchy, that wasn't the question. The question is: What is
Markus's special rule for Approval? For single-winner Cumulative?

Does he have a special rule for each of those methods? Or does he
have a general rule? And if he has a general rule, then what is it?

Mike Ossipoff


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