[EM] Condorcet Criterion for plurality.

[David Catchpole]

I think Martin's point is correct and insightful. The central problem of
voting theory is insincerity- the divergence of the best vote from the
directed vote.

On Tue, 12 Dec 2000, LAYTON Craig wrote:

> Martin Harper wrote (in part):
>
> >At the very least, it can change what a 'sincere' vote is - suppose you
> have a
> >particularly twisted plurality-like method, which is counted in exactly the
> >same way - most crosses wins - but where the instructions on the ballot
> read:
> >"mark a cross next to the person you'd least like to be elected"
> >
> >If you vote sincerely, then you vote for the person you'd least like to be
> >elected. Which is pretty much the worst possible thing to do from a
> strategic
> >point of view, of course.
>
> I don't think you should define a sincere vote on the instructions on the
> ballot paper.  You're talking about a case in which the electoral
> authorities deliberately mislead people about how their votes will be
> counted.  A sincere vote in a plurality count method is one in which you put
> your first preference first.  I don't think it is a problem to define all
> systems in terms of preferences for the purposes of determining a sincere
> vote.  Approval can be defined as a two tiered preference system (1's and
> 2's).  Even a system like Cumulative could be translated into strict
> preferential terms, say with four candidates and four votes;
>
> A2
> B2
> C0
> D0
>
> translates into standardised preferences as
>
> no first or second preference
> A&B =3rd
> no further preferences
>
> The second is not necessarily a more incorrect way of thinking about the
> system than the first.
>
>

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
History never repeats itself. It stutters.