[EM] Condorcet Criterion for plurality.

[David Catchpole]

I don't have absolute "in government, out of government" tendencies that
would be reflected in a yes/no calculus and I don't think many other
people have. To be honest I've just been ignoring the Demorep yes/no
suggestion (I have my own hubris to worry about!) but I guess I now have
to make my thoughts known. Voters will express yesses and nos to best improve
the outcome for themselves and the way they best improve the outcome for
themselves is with regard, in a deterministic setting, to their cardinal
preferences. A voter who is rabidly in favour of A is expected to vote the
same way as a voter who only just prefers A over the others, all else
being identical. It's the same as if you had an election where you asked a
voter to rank their candidates along a continuum from 0 to 1. All you end up
with is a ranked-approval election, with some candidates jostling on the 1 end
and the others jostling on the 0 end. And there you get the "yes-no"
analogy. The placement on the ends depends on strategy, which depends on
how you think others will vote and who you want most to win- the highest
possible winner in your cardinal scale.

On Mon, 11 Dec 2000 DEMOREP1 at aol.com wrote:

>
> In a message dated 12/11/00 5:25:41 PM, s349436 at student.uq.edu.au wrote:
>
> <<Votes:
>
> A>B>C
> A>B>C
> A>B>C
> B>A>C
> B>A>C
> C>A>B
> C>A>B
> C>A>B
> C>A>B
>
> Using plurality, C wins. If we assume that voters have rankings, _whether
> or not they can express them on their ballots_, then plurality fails a
> Condorcet criterion.>>
>
> ---
> D- The A and B votes are a standard divided majority (which I have been
> noting for years).
>
> Where is a YES/NO vote on each choice ???
>
>

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