[EM] Schulze's method fails Condorcet's Criterion, right?

[Markus Schulze]

Dear Mike,

you wrote (2 Dec 2000):
> Markus wote (2 Dec 2000):
> > Criteria and election methods are defined on the reported
> > vNM utilities of the voters. In your example, candidate B
> > is the Condorcet winner of the reported vNM utilities and
> > the Schulze method chooses candidate B. Therefore your
> > example doesn't demonstrate a violation of the Condorcet
> > criterion.
> >
> > In your example, you presume that candidate C is the
> > Condorcet winner of the sincere vNM utilities and that as
> > some voters vote strategically candidate B is the Condorcet
> > winner of the reported vNM utilities. But in so far as
> > criteria and election methods are defined on the reported
> > vNM utilities, it is only relevant how the voters vote but
> > not why they vote the way they vote.
>
> I've guessed and suggested that the uniform way would be to
> use 0-info strategy. If that's it, then: Schulze's method
> fails Condorcet's Criterion.

So you say that due to your theory an election method meets
the Condorcet criterion iff it always chooses the sincere
Condorcet winner whenever a sincere Condorcet winner exists
and the voters use a 0-info strategy. Could you please post
an example of an election method that meets the Condorcet
criterion due to your "universally accepted" theory?

Markus Schulze