[EM] Comments on Don's reply to Ruen

[MIKE OSSIPOFF]

I don't need to know which of you was first, or maybe you both are
>reading the same author, or maybe each of you have reinvented the wheel,
>but I digress.

So far as I'm aware, Tom Round was first. But someone might well have
suggested it before him--only not on EM.

>      I rate IRV-plus Withdrawal the best of the Approval Methods, better
>than Bucklin, better than Borda aka Approval Count

Don tends to be loose with definitions. Borda is not known as the
"Approval Count", except to Don. Yes, Approval can be regarded as a
mini-Borda, without Borda's strategy problems. Approval, Borda, &
Condorcet are all what Don calls "Bottom" methods, because they
look at overall high-ratedness, rather than acting irrevocably based
only on 1st choices.

The 5% who voted only for Gore in the example aren't really the
issue. The issue is Nader's voters' right to let Nader withdraw, so
that their votes against Bush can be counted.


>      One more comment: Because the withdrawal will only be undertaken if 
>it
>will change the outcome of the election, this decision should not be made
>by a single person, who is playing King maker, not even the candidate
>involved.

If it were contrary to the wishes of his voters, Don's concern would
make sense. Don likes to use the word "kingmaker". Don seems to be
repeating the old IRVie objection that the withdrawing candidate is
somehow acting against the wishes of his voters. How can a losing
candidate be acting against his voters by letting their vote go to
a candidate who can win against someone less-liked by those voters?
But you see the futility of trying to talk to an IRVie.

>If you must advocate candidate withdrawal, then I suggest that the
>withdrawal should be automatic with the election system. This is possible
>by a redesign of Bucklin. The results produces by the redesign will come
>very close to candidate withdrawal results. The method would work as
>follows:
>    1) If there is a candidate with a majority of the first choices, he is
>the winner and the election is over.
>    2) If no majority winner, then we add the second choices of all the
>lower candidates to the first choices.

Presumably, by this, Don means that each ranking who has as its current
top choice the candidate with lowest current vote total gives a vote
to its next choice.

This proposal isn't new. It's one version of "Ordered Bucklin", a
Bucklin in which some, not all, voters give a vote to their next
choice.

That Ordered Bucklin is certainly a big improvement over IRV, but
doesn't bring as much improvement as the candidate withdrawal option.
But, then, all this is academic, since the twits who promote IRV
won't consider any sort of mitigation anyway. Stick with proposing
Condorcet & Approval. Ordered Bucklin is a rank method, and must be
compared to other rank methods. It certainly isn't as good as Condorcet.
It fails SFC & GSFC. Its only value was as an IRV mitigation compromise.
But there can't be such a compromise, and so Ordered Bucklin is
valueless.

For more information on voting systems, check the website:

http://www.electionmethods.org

Mike Ossipoff


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