First Choices tiebreaker

[Mike Ossipoff]

[I'm replying to comments at the end of this letter. It's about
why I'm unsubscribing again]

New Democracy writes:
> 
> - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - January 19 1997
> Dear DEMOREP,
> 
>    This letter of 01/16/97 is good - like good I get to see how circular
> ties can be broken. More comments below.
> 
> >After rethinking the problem of Condorcet circular ties, I note that such
> >ties occur because any tiebreaker method using additional rankings beyond the
> >first choice ranking has the potential for strategic voting (i.e. attempted
> >candidate manipulation of such additional rankings depending on the
> >tiebreaker that uses such additional rankings-- a sort of manipulation-
> >tiebreaker method feedback loop).
> >
> >A possible remedy if there is a circular tie would be to ignore the
> >additional rankings.
> >
> >Namely,
> >1. Do the standard head to head pairings.
> >2. Drop all candidates who cannot beat or tie any other candidate.
> >3. If there is a circular tie, then drop the candidate with the lowest number
> >of first choice votes. (Such candidate has had his/her chance to beat the
> >other candidates).
> >4. Relook at the head to head pairings of the candidates remaining in the
> >circular tie.
> >5. If the circular tie continues, then move up the rankings of the candidate
> >dropped in step 3 (or step 6). (e.g. a second choice vote becomes a revised
> >first choice vote on a ballot that has the dropped candidate as the first
> >choice candidate).
> >6. Drop the candidate with the lowest number of revised first choice votes.
> >7. Repeat steps 4, 5 and 6 as necessary.
> >
> >Relative rankings would remain intact.  Moving up the votes in step 5 after a
> >choice is dropped would encourage the making of additional rankings and
> >discourage truncated votes (i.e. a single winner just might end up with a
> >majority of all the votes).
> 
> 
> Donald writes: I have a question: If you were to use this Remedy on an
> example that was not a circular tie would this Remedy produce the same
> Condorcet winner? My thinking is that if your Remedy always produced the
> same Condorcet winner for noncircular tie elections then this point would
> serve as one proof of the validity of your Remedy.
> 
> 
> >As much as it might shock some folks, the above is a combination of the head
> >to head part of Condorcet along with the often attacked Instant Run-off.
> 
> Shock is an understatement - Mike had a "vapor lock" in his chest and Steve

I can't find a reply from me to that message, so Don seems to be
outdoing himself by graduating to inventing nonexistent replies.

Shock? It would hardly shock me when someone like Don or
Demorep makes another of their innumerable disposable
proposals.

But what I have been saying, in reply to these sloppy & careless
proposals has been: I've been calmly & carefully repeating
whjat I said about what is needed for a method proposal

1. A concise statement of the choice rule
2. A statement of why the method is better than other methods

Part #2, & usually part #1, has been lacking in all of Don's
& Demorep's proposals. 

Is that the reply that Don is referring to?

Again, Don is using metaphors of phyisical harm or violence
in order to bolster his fantasy of victory where there is
none.

I brought that up once before. I don't consider it acceptable
behavior on this list. I've asked that Don be removed from
the list. No such luck; he wasn't removed. So, since I'm 
tired of it, I'm going to quit the lists.

I'll also make that statement in a separate posting.


Mike Ossipoff







> has gone into seclusion and "will be taking the vapors".(not the same
> vapors)
> 
> Keep up the good work DEMOREP.
> 
> Sincerely,
> 
> 
> Donald Eric Davison of New Democracy at http://www.mich.com/~donald
> 
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> 
> 
> 
> .-
> 


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