Truncation Resistance #2 criterion

[DEMOREP1 at aol.com]

Mr. Eppley has the cart before the horse in his 46-10-10-34 examples.

Whether or not a candidate is the compromise candidate in a circular tie
depends on how the voters vote.   Saying that candidate X is the compromise
candidate if the voters do not make him/her such compromise is somewhat
illogical.  If voter freedom exists, then there is no specific way the voters
*MUST* vote.

Mr. Eppley is apparently assuming that (1) candidate A knows exactly how the
54 combined B and C voters will be voting and that his/her 46 voters are
robots subject to A's total influence (which may or may not be true) and (2)
candidates B and C know nothing about how the A voters are voting (or not
voting) for their second choices and have no influence over their respective
supporters.

The general cases for first choices just as well might be the extreme cases--
49 A, 3 B, 48 C
or
49 A, 25 B, 26 C.

As has been repeatedly pointed out, any election method (even Condorcet as
amazing as that may be to some) has strategic voting possibilities.   For
example in some methods, the mere making of a second choice by a voter can
defeat the voter's first choice (when combined with the first choices of
other voters).  Example- the 34 CB voters obviously help B become the
compromise winner in the left 46-10-10-34 example.

I must say again that if a single winner method does not guarantee a majority
of all voters (moav) winner (51 of 100), then it will have almost zero chance
of being adopted. Some of the competition to head to head remains approval
voting, top 2 runoff and instant run off which all will likely produce such a
winner (but who may not be head to head compromise winner).
Thus, I note that if the first 2 choices are deemed acceptable to the voters
in the left example then there is--

   A       B         C
 46*    46
10       10*
           10*      10
           34        34*
-----------------
56       100      44

C fails to get majority support and loses. B wins heads to head 54 to 46.

In the truncated 46 A right example, the result becomes

A      B      C
56   54     44

C still loses. B still wins head to head 54 to 46.

Thus, I suggest that no method be posted on this list that does not guarantee
a majority of all voters winner (i.e. a MOAV criterion).