[EM] The Hippopotamus Logic

[DEMOREP1 at aol.com]

Donald's Nov. 6 comments again suggest to me that there should be a majority
yes/no test for executive and judicial office elections in addition to
numerical rankings.
The
46 ABC
20 B
34 CBA example on a head to head basis produces
46 A < 54 B
56 B > 34 C
34 C < 46 A 
or 54/56 B > 46 A > 34 C
In extreme times this example might happen. Both A and C could be
 extremists. B could be a "moderate". The second choices of the A and C fans
may all well prefer the moderate over the other extremist.

If IRO is used, A wins by a minority vote  46 A > 34 C.

If there was a yes/no vote on the acceptability of each candidate, the
results might be (assuming that the second choices are "true")
A 46 yes, 54 no- defeated
B 100 yes, 0 no- survives
C 34 yes, 66 no- defeated
-----
A yes/no vote in Donald's second example would produce (assuming 2nd choices
to be true)---
             A      B       C
23AB    23     23  
23AC    23              23
10BA    10     10
10BC             10     10
17CA    17              17  
17CB             17     17
Tots     73     60     67
Three majority acceptable candidates

A yes/no vote in Donald's third example would produce (assuming 2nd choices
to be true)---
40A      40  
2AB        2      2
4AC        4               4
20B               20
30C                        30
2CA        2                2 
2CB                 2       2
Tots     48     24     38
No majority acceptable candidate

It should be noted in all examples that if the starting conditions are
changed (i.e. the ballots having various ABC combinations including
truncations), then the results may well be different.

The underlying situation in all of Donald's examples is whether or not there
is a "true" majority in favor of any candidate and whether or not any such
"true" majorities are divided (such that a minority can attempt to defeat the
temporarily disunited majority).

I again suggest that a majority yes/no vote will obviously defeat minority
candidates. 

The minority voters can happily vote their first choices (or other early
choices, if there is more than one minority candidate). 

If such minority voters want to influence which of the divided majority
candidates is going to win, then they will make additional choices.

If the majority voters want to influence which of the divided majority
candidates is going to win, then they will make additional choices to
counteract the additional choices of the minority voters.

Example 
First choices A 25, B 16, C 14, X 27, Y 18
(3 divided majority candidates and 2 divided minority candidates)

Assume that the A,B,C voters are sufficiently united to defeat X and Y by 55
to 45 votes and to tolerate each other by the same 55 to 45 votes. 
The X and Y 1st choice voters (and presumably Y and X 2nd choice voters) can
do nothing or vote for the A,B,C candidates for their 3rd or 4th choices. 
The A,B,C 1st choice voters can no nothing or vote for one of the three for
their 2nd choice.
Thus, additional choices are encouraged by having a majority yes/no vote.