7 Voters example

[DEMOREP1 at aol.com]

A 7 voter Condorcet example
                 A  v   B        B  v  Z       Z  v   A
AZB           1                        1                 1
ABZ           1                1                         1
BZA                   1        1                1
BAZ                   1        1                         1
3 Z[A=B]                               3        3
Tots         2       2        3       4        4      3     

                    A=B          Z>B                Z>A
If there is not an approval vote, then a plurality candidate (Z) will be
encouraged to have his/her supporters truncate their votes and attempt to get
some votes from the supporters of each of the subdivided majority candidates.

This is yet another "unlikely" but not impossible example.

I maintain the necessity to have a yes/no approval/disapproval vote on each
candidate in executive and judicial elections to avoid the above manipulation
possibilities.