Single Person Elections 6/27/96

[Mike Ossipoff]

DEMOREP1 at aol.com writes:
> 
> Single Winner Method with Combined Choices Tie Breaker
> by DEMOREP1 at aol.com
> 27 June 1996
> ----
> Summary Features- majority approval, head to head combinations, limited
> approval tie breaker (using highest majority in combined choice levels).

What criteria does this new method of yours meet? What properties
does it have? Show where its results are better than other proposed
methods. 

You're announcing a new method, and it seems a little premature
to already be writing up the legal language. It would make sense
to simply state your proposed choice rule, and then tell why it's
better than the other ones that have been and are being proposed
here.

All the articles & sections make it unnecessarily & tediously
long. Besides, it's far from certain that your legal language
is usable legal language. Some of its meanings are uncertain.
The important thing for legal language is that it's meaning be
entirely precise & unambiguous. If it isn't, then no amount
of sections & articles, numbered & lettered, will make it into
legal language.

I copied your letter because I intended to point out the uncertain
meanings in your language, but, as I said, legal language is very
premature anyway, when a method has just been proposed, and no one
has even said in what way it's supposed to be better than other
methods.

I've commented already on your tendency to propose lots &
lots of methods, and never give reasons for them. Though you
mention majority rule in connection with the disapproval count,
you never answered my statement that Condorcet makes it very
difficult for a majority-rejected candidate to win anyway, due
to its compliance with GMC. As was already pointed out, for instance,
Dole loses & Clinton wins in my 40,25,35 example, when counted
by Condorcet's method.

Anyway, aside from the Disapproval count, you never say anything
about why your latest method is better than others, or what
advantage it has.

Incidentally, counting votes-for, summed over all of a candidate's
pairwise comparisons is Borda's method, a method notorious
for its strategy problems, and for its (perhaps unique) ability
to fail to elect a candidate who is ranked 1st by a majority
of the voters. 


Mike


[I haven't added any comments to the letter copied below. I
initially intended to comment on uncertain meanings in the
legal language, but am not going to, since legal language doesn't
matter until the method is chosen as a proposal]






> ----
> Article ___ 
> Single Person Executive and Judicial Elections
> 
> Sec. 1. [(a)] This Article shall be used for the election of one person to an
> executive or judicial elective office.
> [Option- (b) At least ____ days before the election day for the office each
> candidate for the office may make public his/her numbered choices in rank
> order for such office [Suboption- without using any same numbered choices].
> (c) Any such choices shall be given to each elector with the ballot for such
> office.
> (d) Each ballot shall contain a location whereby an elector may agree with
> the choices of a candidate.]
> 
> Sec. 2. (a) (1) The names of the candidates shall be put in a column with 2
> [Option- 3] additional columns. (2) In column 2, each elector may vote 1 for
> a first choice candidate, 2 for a second choice candidate, etc. (3) In column
> 3, each elector may vote for each candidate who the elector finds to be
> acceptable to hold the office. 
> [Option- (b) The same choice number may be used more than once.]
> [Option- (c) If an elector votes to use the Section 1 candidate choices, then
> such choices that do not duplicate the elector's choices shall be deemed to
> be in order after the elector's choices.]
> [Option- (d) In column 4 there shall be a location in which each elector may
> give an approval percentage to the candidate (100 highest, 0 lowest).]
> 
> Sec. 3. (a) Any candidate who does not get the acceptance of a majority of
> all the electors in column 3 shall lose.
> (b) If one candidate remains, then he/she shall be elected.
> (c) Any vacancy in the office shall be filled for a term of not more than 2
> years by the legislative body having jurisdiction over the office.
> 
> Sec. 4. (a) Any candidates losing at the same time in a section shall be
> deemed removed from all ballots.
> (b) The remaining candidates on each ballot shall move up in order to fill
> any vacant choices [Option- (but shall not receive the same choice number as
> a remaining candidate by moving up)].
> 
> Sec. 5. (a) If a candidate gets more votes when matched against each other
> candidate on all ballots, then he/she shall be elected.
> (b) (1) If any candidate gets less votes when matched against each other
> candidate on all ballots, then he/she shall lose. (2) The preceding sentence
> shall be repeated.
> (c) [(1)] In each match the candidate on each ballot having the lowest
> numbered choice shall receive one vote. [Option- (2) If both candidates in a
> match have the same choice number on a ballot, then each candidate shall
> receive 0.5 vote.]
> 
> Sec. 6. (a) (1) If a candidate remains to be elected, then the first plus
> second choice votes on all ballots shall be combined. (2) The candidate, if
> any, who receives the highest majority of votes on all ballots shall be
> elected. 
> (b) (1) If necessary, the votes on the next choice level shall be combined
> with the votes on preceding choice levels (first plus second plus third,
> first plus second plus third plus fourth, etc.). (2) After each choice level
> is added, the candidate, if any, who receives the highest majority of votes
> on all ballots shall be elected.
> (c) (1) If necessary, the votes on all choice levels shall be combined. (2)
> The candidate with the highest number of votes shall be elected.
> (d) If candidates are tied at any choice level in this section, then a
> lottery shall be used.
> [Option- (e) In this section if two or more candidates (C) have the same
> choice number on a ballot, then each candidate shall receive a vote of 1/C on
> each of the C choice levels involved on that ballot.]
> .-
> 


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