Majority Tie Breaker

[DEMOREP1 at aol.com]

As I have written before and will write again- the main competitors to a/the
Condorcet method are (a) top 2 in runoff (used in most nonpartisan elections
and in runoff primaries in many southern States), (b) majority preference
voting (MPV)- repeatedly dropping the losest ranked candidate until one
candidate remains and (c) approval voting (voting for one or more candidates
without ranking them). 

Each will almost always produce a majority of all voters winner (despite
their well known possibilities of not picking a Condorcet head to head beats
all winner).

As should be obvious from the semi- continuous use of 3 candidate circular
tie examples on this list, there is a distinct possibility of not having a
Condorcet (beats all) winner (i.e. each candidate loses at least 1 head to
head match).

With more than 3 candidates, the alleged majority (and the alleged minority)
may be (and probably will be) even more fractured for head to head purposes.

Thus, I again say that a single winner method must practically guarantee a
majority of all voters (moav) winner (which of course can be done by a yes/no
vote for/against each candidate) in combination with a Condorcet head to head
test and an additional tie breaker..