"votes against" in pair-defeats?

[DEMOREP1 at aol.com]

Mr. Ossipoff wrote-
For instance, in my standard 40,25,35 example, with
Dole, Clinton & Nader, where sincere rankings are:

40%: Dole, Clinton, Nader
25%: Clinton
35%: Nader, Clinton, Dole

.and where the Dole voters truncate, ranking only Dole,
Condorcet picks Clinton, the Condorcet winner, while
Simpson-Kramer (the relative of Condorcet that looks at
all pairings instead of just defeats) makes it a tie
between Clinton & Nader. If the simple tiebreaker of
Plurality is used, then Nader wins. In any case, the
method would either be indecisive, or its choice between
Clinton & Nader would depend on some other tie-breaker
which might not do what we'd most like, and may not
do as good a job of picking the Condorcet winner.
- end excerpt

I again suggest that a separate majority approval/disapproval vote should be
done first. Namely  in the 40-25-35 example the supporters of C and N would
presumably defeat D 60-40 (assuming that the C and N supporters would not
vote to defeat each other). C would then beat N 65 -35.