Majority Tie Breaker

[DEMOREP1 at aol.com]

Plurality does not go far enough for the mere fact that most of the time it
produces a minority winner. (Plurality may be deemed a form of limited
approval voting- only the first choice votes count).
The plain Condorcet method will often fail to produce a winner.
Approval voting (which is a major, if not the chief, competitor to another
single winner method) goes too far by having all choice level votes count. 

Approval may produce the wrong majority winner (such as if in a 4 candidate
election, one candidate gets a majority of the first choice votes (thereby
beating each other candidate head to head) but another candidate may get a
larger majority of all 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th choice votes.

Thus, there is in order---
Plurality
Condorcet
Approval
I thus suggest that if Condorcet fails, then a majority tie breaker will lie
between plain Condorcet and total Approval.

The reason for a majority winner should be rather obvious. Any reform merely
raising the minority percentage is hardly good enough (such as changing a 38
percent plurality winner to a 45 percent winner with *the* utopian single
winner method).