Brief Descriptions of Voting Methods, Part 1
Bruce Anderson
landerso at ida.org
Sun Jun 2 04:40:17 PDT 1996
On May 27, 5:00pm, Steve Eppley wrote:
> Subject: Re: Attachment CRITTBL1
> Bruce, you've provided a table of some ranked ballot voting methods
> which meet or fail to meet 7 criteria. Quite a few of the methods
> meet all 7 criteria, including Smith//Condorcet.
>
> I presume that you're planning to post definitions of the methods
> mentioned in the table. I'm looking forward to that, because many of
> the methods' names are unfamiliar to me and because I'm curious about
> how Condorcet is defined (and by whom).
>
>-- End of excerpt from Steve Eppley
Quick-and-very-rough outlines of the definitions of the ranked-ballot voting
methods listed on my table of methods vs. criteria follow.
A. Elemental Direct and Sequential Deletion Methods:
Anderson: selects the candidate(s) with the least pairwise losses, with ties in
least losses being broken by most pairwise wins -- I am indebted to Mike for
this simplification of my original, more complex definition. Anderson reduces
to Copeland when there are no pairwise ties.
(Approval is not a ranked-ballot voting method.)
Arrow-Raynaud: is sequential deletion by the minimum of the row maximums of
r'(i,j) = r(i,j,1/2).
Borda: is equivalent to selecting the candidate(s) with the maximum sum over j
of r'(i,j).
Let b(i,k) be the number of voters who rank candidate i uniquely in kth place
plus 1/m of the number of voters who rank exactly m-1 other candidate(s) as
being tied with candidate i strictly behind exactly k-h other candidates for
some h from 1 through m. Let n be the total number of candidates. Then Borda
is also equivalent to selecting the candidate(s) with the maximum sum over k of
(n-k)b(i,k).
Bucklin:
Let K(i) be the smallest value of k such that
b(i,1)+...+b(i,k) > n/2.
Then I define Bucklin to select the candidate(s) that minimize K(i), with ties
being broken by maximum b(i,1)+...+b(i,k), then by maximum b(i,1)+...+b(i,k-1),
and so on.
Condorcet: selects the candidate(s) with the maximum of the row minimums of
r'(i,j). This definition is not the "official" EM definition, but (according to
what I have read) it is as consistent with Condorcet's writings as is the EM
definition, and it greatly facilitates proofs. I am careful to construct
counter-examples that are valid for both definitions.
/Condorcet/1a/: is sequential deletion by the maximum of the row minimums of
r'(i,j). The /1a/ means (in my notation) to only delete 1 candidate at a time,
and to continue until only one candidate is left.
Coombs: is sequential deletion by most last-place rankings, i.e., by the
maximum of b(i,n). Coombs continues only until there is a majority winner (or
until b(i,k) = b(i',k') for all remaining i and i' and all relevant k and k'.
Copeland: selects the candidate(s) that maximize (pairwise wins minus pairwise
losses), which is equivalent to selecting the candidate(s) that maximize
2(pairwise wins) + (pairwise ties), which is equivalent to selecting the
candidate(s) with the best pairwise won-lost record, counting pairwise ties as
half a win and half a loss.
To be continued.
Bruce
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